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While the opportunities offered by globalization can be large, the question is often raised 
whether the actual distribution of gains is fair and, in particular, whether the poor benefit 
proportionately less from globalization and could under some circumstances actually be 
hurt by it. The paper discusses channels and transmission mechanisms through which the 
process of globalization affects different aspects and dimensions of poverty in the 
developing world. It examines how these numerous channels interact, as the net effects on 
poverty depend on the relative strength of the positive and negative forces of globalization. 
On the basis of our analysis of these transmission mechanisms from globalization to the 
world’s poor, the paper discusses what may constitute a policy framework for encouraging 
globalization to be pro-poor. 
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1 Introduction 
Globalization offers participating countries new opportunities for accelerating growth and 
development but, at the same time, it also poses challenges to, and imposes constraints on 
policymakers in the management of national, regional and global economic systems. While 
the opportunities offered by globalization can be large, the question is often raised whether 
the actual distribution of gains is fair and, in particular, whether the poor benefit 
proportionately less from globalization and could under some circumstances actually be 
hurt by it. The risks and costs brought about by globalization can be significant for fragile 
developing economies and the world’s poor.1 The fear that the poor have been by-passed 
or actually hurt by globalization has been highlighted by the findings from a number of 
recent studies, which point towards a continuing high inequality in world income 
distribution and limited, if not a lack of, convergence among participating national 
economies and across regions as globalization has proceeded.2 There is much empirical 
evidence that openness contributes to more within-country inequality. China is a good 
example with coastal provinces benefiting but not inland provinces 
 
The progress on poverty reduction has also been uneven. The share of the population of the 
developing countries living below US$1 per day declined from 40 per cent to 21 per cent 
between 1981 and 2001, but this was mainly achieved by the substantial reduction of the 
poor in Asia, in particular in China (Chen and Ravallion 2004). Furthermore, the total 
number of people living under US$2 per day actually increased worldwide. In particular, 
poverty has increased significantly in Africa in terms of poverty incidence as well as the 
depth of poverty.3 Though any trend in poverty and income inequality observed so far 
cannot be exclusively or even mainly attributed to the ‘globalization’ effect, as such, these 
various estimates, even the most optimistic ones, cannot dismiss the concerns raised that 
globalization as it has proceeded so far may have had at least some adverse effects on 
poverty and income distribution.4 Indeed, globalization has created winners and losers at 
numerous levels throughout modern history.5 The losers include many of those who have 
                                                 
1 Birdsall (2002), for example, argues that it is the poorer countries and the poor who tend to bear the risks 
and costs of the higher volatility brought about by globalization. 
2 See Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006b) for a review of literature and more detailed discussion on the concepts 
used for analysing the trends in world inequality and empirical evidence. For historical trends towards income 
divergence see Pritchett (1997). Quah (1996) also discusses the twin peaks in the world’s distribution 
dynamics, which are characterized by the tendency for stratification and polarization.  
3 See Wade (2002) and Deaton (2001, 2002) for critical discussions of the World Bank’s estimates of global 
poverty and inequality used in these studies.  
4 See also Culpeper (2002) for a recent critical literature review of the effect of globalization on inequality, 
where a set of triangular relationships between globalization, growth and inequality is systematically 
discussed. 
5 See Williamson (2002) for winners and losers from globalization in modern history   2
keenly participated in the process of globalization. These concerns have generated a 
passionate debate worldwide as well as a powerful anti-globalization movement. 
 
The globalization-poverty relationship is complex and heterogeneous, involving 
multifaceted channels. It is highly probable that globalization-poverty relationships may be 
non-linear in many aspects, involving several thresholds effects. Indeed, each subset of 
links embedded in the globalization (openness)-growth-income distribution-poverty nexus 
can be contentious and controversial. Besides the ‘growth’ effects of globalization on 
poverty (that is, the effects of globalization on poverty filtered through economic growth), 
globalization/integration is known to directly create winners and losers through other 
channels, affecting both vertical and horizontal inequalities (Ravallion 2004a). Because 
these multifaceted channels interact dynamically over space and time, the net effects of 
globalization on the poor can only be judged on the basis of context-specific empirical 
studies. Cross-country studies requiring precise measurements and definition of the two 
key concepts—globalization and poverty—tend to fail to give a deeper insight into this 
critical nexus. Both concepts are multi-dimensional, and not easily captured in a composite 
index to be used in a meaningful manner in cross-country comparative studies.  
Building on earlier research projects, UNU-WIDER initiated a project on ‘The Impact of 
Globalization on the World’s Poor’ in 2004. The project aims at producing a set of 
rigorous theoretical and empirical economic analyses, which could allow us: (i) to deepen 
our understanding into how conditions facing the world’s poor have been evolving under 
globalization; and (ii) to provide a framework yielding the elements of a strategy for ‘pro-
poor globalization’.  
 
This essay brings out some of the highlights from the papers presented at the first project 
conference in Helsinki, October 2004.6 That conference focused on conceptual and 
methodological issues with a view of identifying and discerning channels and transmission 
mechanisms through which the process of globalization affects different aspects and 
dimensions of poverty in the developing world. In this study we examine how these 
numerous channels interact, as the net effects on poverty depend on the relative strength of 
the positive and negative forces of globalization. On the basis of our analysis of these 
transmission mechanisms from globalization to the world’s poor, we also discuss what 
may constitute a policy framework for encouraging globalization to be more pro-poor.  
 
In Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006b), we identified and explored various transmission 
mechanisms in detail. The first and most important of these mechanisms is the growth- 
inequality-poverty channel. Other channels in the globalization-poverty nexus operate, 
respectively, through changes in relative factor and goods prices, factor movements, the 
                                                 
6 See Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006a) for a more comprehensive summary of main findings from the papers 
presented at the first conference in Helsinki, October 2004. The full set of the conference papers appear in 
two publications: a special issue of World Development and in a Palgrave Macmillan volume, both of which 
will be forthcoming in 2006.   3
nature of technological change and technological diffusion, the impact of globalization on 
volatility and vulnerability, the worldwide flow of information, global disinflation, and 
institutions. Following this approach, the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we 
discuss various relationships embedded in the openness-growth-inequality-poverty nexus. 
In Section 3, the paper analyses how globalization affects poverty through the various 
other  channels listed above. In the concluding section, some preliminary thoughts are 
presented aimed at formulating a set of measures to make globalization more pro-poor.  
2  The openness-growth-inequality-poverty nexus and channel  
The ‘growth’ channel, through which globalization affects the poor, is examined by 
scrutinising the causal chain in the openness-growth-inequality-poverty nexus link by link.  
2.2 The  openness-growth  link 
Policies of openness through liberalization of trade and investment regimes, and capital 
movements have been advocated worldwide for their growth and welfare enhancing effects 
on the basis of the propositions embedded in the economic theories of international trade 
and investment (for instance, the Ricardian comparative advantage theory, the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson model, the new trade theories à la Krugman, and the model of 
intertemporal international borrowing/lending). In these models, the main growth-
enhancing effects of openness are assumed to filter through: (i) static efficiency gains 
associated with improved resource allocation for national economies as well as for the 
world economy due to increased specialization; (ii) dynamic efficiency gains from such 
factors as economies of scale, diffusion of information, technology transfers, knowledge 
spillover effects as well as intertemporal trade gains from cross-border borrowing/lending 
for increased investment and consumption smoothing and portfolio risk diversification. 
 
Indeed, openness through trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial markets 
could increase the flow of goods and capital across national borders and could contribute 
significantly to economic growth (the openness-growth link). However, the direction of 
causality in this link is still being debated as well as how trade and capital flows could be 
interlinked into a virtuous circle. Furthermore, the positive openness-growth link is neither 
automatically guaranteed nor universally observable. The growth-enhancing effect of trade 
openness depends critically on the way a country is integrated into the global economy, as 
discussed below. Similarly, the transfer of technology, skills and management know-how 
that is assumed to accompany FDI is not necessarily automatic or guaranteed. Further, the 
postulated positive effects of portfolio and other capital flows (hot money) on growth have 
been questioned increasingly in recent years. The recent IMF study (Prasad et al. 2003) 
acknowledges that it is difficult to establish a strong positive causal relationship between 
financial globalization and economic growth.7 Furthermore, these short-term capital flows 
                                                 
7 See Nissanke and Stein (2003) for a critical view on the effect of financial globalization on economic 
growth in emerging market economies.   4
contribute to the increased vulnerability to external shocks of the recipient developing 
countries. A large number of empirical studies based on cross-country regressions have 
been conducted to show the beneficial effects of an open economy regime on growth; for 
example, Dollar (1992); Sachs and Warner (1995); Dollar and Kraay (2001a, b).8 
However, the validity of these empirical exercises has been contested on technical grounds 
by many researchers.9 
2.3 The  growth-inequality-poverty  interrelationship 
The second link in the causal chain from openness to poverty is the interrelationship 
between growth and inequality. There are two conflicting theoretical strands relating 
income inequality and wealth inequality to growth. The classical approach best reflected 
by Kaldor (1956) argues that a higher marginal propensity among the rich to save than 
among the poor implies that a higher degree of initial income inequality will yield higher 
aggregate savings, capital accumulation and growth. Additional arguments in favour of the 
growth enhancing effect of inequality are based on the existence of investment 
indivisibilities and incentive effects.10 From this theoretical perspective, the desirability of 
an unequal income distribution is thus rationalized on economic grounds, that is on the 
basis of the claim that ‘more poverty today is a precondition to more economic growth and 
less poverty in the future’ (Thorbecke 2004). 
 
The contrasting new political economy theories linking greater inequality to reduced 
growth operate through a number of subchannels (Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). 
These subchannels are, respectively:  
(i)  unproductive rent seeking activities that reduce the security of property;  
(ii)  the diffusion of political and social instability leading to greater uncertainty and 
lower investment;  
(iii)  redistributive policies encouraged by income inequality that impose disincentives 
on the rich to invest and accumulate resources;  
(iv)  imperfect credit markets resulting in underinvestment by the poor, particularly in 
human capital; and  
(v)  a relatively small income share accruing to the middle class—implying greater 
inequality—has a strong positive effect on fertility, and this, in turn, has a 
significant and negative impact on growth. 
 
                                                 
8 See World Bank (2002) for a summary of these cross-country studies on the openness-growth link.  
9 See Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) for an excellent critical assessment of these cross-sectional studies. See 
also Pritchett (1996) for detailed discussion and comparison among various measures used in empirical 
analyses of outward trade orientation in least developed countries. Clearly, the simple trade intensity index 
(exports plus imports/GDP)—a standard variable frequently used to measure a country’s outward policy 
orientation in cross-country regressions—is unsatisfactory and inappropriate to be used for testing the 
hypothesis on the trade openness-growth link.  
10 See Aghion et al. (1999) for detailed discussion on this debate.    5
In addition, wide income and wealth disparities can impact on education, health and crime, 
through such manifestations as underinvestment in human capital, malnutrition leading to 
low worker productivity, stress and anxiety. In turn these manifestations may contribute to 
lower long-term growth. With particular reference to capital market imperfections and the 
role of resultant credit constraints, Aghion et al. (1999: 1617) make a similar point, 
emphasizing that ‘wealth inequality determines investment in physical or human capital, 
which in turn affects the long-run growth rate’.  
 
The rejection of the Kuznets hypothesis of the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
growth and inequality (as per capita income increases) by a number of empirical studies 
provided much impetus to the new political economy literature that postulates that high 
initial inequality is detrimental to economic growth.11 The proponents of this approach, 
while rejecting the immutability of the Kuznets curve, argue that growth patterns yielding 
more inequality in the income distribution would, in turn, engender lower future growth 
paths.  
 
In the light of the new literature that emphasises the impact of inequality on incentives, 
social conflicts, transaction costs and property rights, the possible link between growth and 
poverty is examined in the previous UNU-WIDER studies on growth-inequality-poverty 
interrelationships (Addison and Cornia 2001; Cornia 2004, Shorrocks and van der Hoeven 
2004). They argue that the widespread increase in inequality has been detrimental to the 
objective of poverty reduction, because large rises in inequality have stifled growth, and 
because poverty, at any given growth rate of GDP, falls less rapidly in the case of a more 
unequal distribution than in the case of a more equitable one. The obvious policy 
implication following from these studies is that successful poverty alleviation depends not 
only on favourable changes in average GDP per capita growth but also on favourable 
changes in income inequality. 
 
The conclusions drawn from these recent studies challenge the dominant mainstream 
views derived from a number of World Bank studies such as Deininger and Squire (1996); 
Li et al. (1998); Dollar and Kraay (2001a, b). The conventional views argue that there is no 
clear association between inequality and growth and that growth is distribution-neutral, 
hence growth is the only realistic option. For example, Dollar and Kraay (2001a, b) state 
that ‘since the share of income going to the poor does not change on average with growth, 
the poor benefit from growth’, and ‘trade is good for growth and growth is good for the 
poor’. However, the methodology used in yielding these results has since then been 
challenged. Ravallion (2002) argues, for example, that average neutrality found in the 
Dollar and Kraay study and other studies is not inconsistent with strong distributional 
effects at the country level. A critical question, according to Ravallion, is whether or not 
inequality is an impediment to poverty reducing growth, or in other words, whether high 
                                                 
11 See Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) for a comprehensive review of this new political economy 
literature on the subject.   6
inequality attenuates the growth elasticity of poverty. His analysis confirms that the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to growth is found to decline with the extent of 
inequality.  
 
Thus, we argue that while it is most likely that the poor will benefit from growth, the 
ultimate poverty reduction effects will depend on how the growth pattern affects income 
distribution. Inequality is the filter between growth and poverty reduction.12 If growth 
leads to an increase in income inequality the poor may benefit only slightly or, in some 
instances, actually be hurt by the globalization process. We argue specifically that the 
pattern of economic growth and development, rather than the rate of growth per se, may 
have significant effects on a country’s income distribution and poverty profile. Indeed, the 
recent debate on the meaning of pro-poor growth is related to the complex triangular 
relationships among poverty, growth and inequality. Clearly, poverty reduction would 
require some combination of higher growth and a more pro-poor distribution of the gains 
from growth. Hence what is relevant for poverty reduction is a ‘distribution corrected’ rate 
of growth, as Ravallion notes (2004b), and in our view, growth is considered pro-poor if in 
addition to reducing poverty it also decreases inequality.   
2.4  Diverse approaches for examining the globalization-poverty relationships  
Given the complex relationships embedded in the globalization-poverty nexus, as 
discussed above, it is not surprising to see the diversity in approaches adopted by 
researchers in examining the physiology of the causal chain in the openness-growth-
inequality-poverty. 
 
Taking an aggregate approach, Heshmati (2006) computes two composite indices of 
globalization and examines how poverty and inequality are affected by four globalization 
components. His results generally confirm that initial endowments and the degree and 
nature of integration into the international economy largely determine the distributional 
effects of globalization. The importance of regional variations in understanding the 
globalization-inequality-poverty nexus is further taken up by Kalwij and Verschoor (2006). 
They examine the impact of globalization on poverty, focusing on the responsiveness of 
poverty to aggregate changes in income distribution. On the basis of region-specific 
analysis, they challenge the dominant mainstream view that globalization is good for the 
poor by generating approximately distribution-neutral income growth, as argued by Collier 
and Dollar (2001). They reaffirm instead the position emphasized by Ravallion (1997) and 
Bourguignon (2003: 3-26) that inequality, in particular the initial income distribution, has 
an important indirect effect on poverty through diminishing prospects for pro-poor growth.  
 
                                                 
12 See Naschold (2004) for empirical evidences showing that in least developed countries distribution effect 
is as important as growth effects for poverty reduction, while growth effect is larger in other low-income and 
middle-income countries.   7
Ravallion (2006) examines more specifically the relationship between trade openness and 
poverty, using three different lenses and techniques: (1) a macro aggregate cross-country 
regression of the impact of trade on poverty; (2) a macro time series analysis of China; and 
(3) a micro lens based on a computable general equilibrium model scrutinizing, 
respectively, the impacts on households of WTO accession in China and cereal 
deprotection in Morocco. Both the macro and micro approaches cast doubt on some widely 
heard generalizations from both sides of the globalization debate. In particular, he points to 
the inadequacy of the conventional ‘macro lens’ for revealing strong and robust trade-
poverty relationship. Ravallion also shows that the link between trade liberalization and 
poverty is tenuous and that it is difficult to ascertain that trade openness is a powerful force 
for poverty reduction in developing countries. However, the tenuous nature of the trade-
poverty relationship cannot necessarily be generalized to all cases. The data presented are 
more suggestive of diverse (and noisy) impacts of trade openness on poverty. Under some 
specific set of conditions openness to trade could clearly be very effective in alleviating 
poverty.  
 
Jenkins (2006) focuses his analysis on the impact of integration within the global economy 
(rather than trade policies as such) on the poor in their role as producers. His central 
question about the impact of globalization on employment and income opportunities for 
poor people is addressed through case studies of three value chains—horticulture, 
garments, and textiles—in four countries, Bangladesh, Kenya, South Africa and Vietnam. 
In the context of analysing the comparative performance among case study countries, he 
proposes to make a clear conceptual distinction between ‘non-globalizer’ and 
‘unsuccessful globalizer’ and he categorises Kenya as a unsuccessful globalizer, while 
Vietnam is successful in integrating in terms of outcome though remaining relatively 
closed in terms of policy.  
 
In presenting the case studies, Jenkins first emphasises that the outcomes of globalization 
processes are highly context-specific, dependent both on the institutional framework and 
government policies which mediate global processes. Several patterns emerge from his 
four case studies of global value chains. For example, the growth of labour intensive 
exports of manufactures and agricultural products does create employment opportunities, 
particularly for low-income women and migrants from rural areas, as horticulture exports 
in Kenya or garment exports in Bangladesh and Vietnam reveal. However, the 
requirements of global value chains mean that these jobs often demand a high degree of 
labour flexibility, long hours of work and poor working conditions, making workers 
vulnerable both in terms of employment and income security. Opening up to global 
competition has also led to job losses and deterioration in working conditions and 
employment conditions, as the case of textile industries in South Africa illustrates. Further, 
Jenkins shows how gains from globalization are likely to be more widely distributed where 
the initial structure of assets and entitlements is more equitable, as in Vietnam. In the latter, 
a strategy of building linkages between the export sector and domestic production has been 
more effective in creating employment and reducing poverty than trade liberalization per   8
se. On the whole, he concludes that even in those cases that have been successful in 
developing labour-intensive exports, the overall impact of globalization on poverty has 
been relatively small. The majority of the poor are not engaged in global production and 
other strategies are required to reach them. Clearly, integration with the global economy is 
not a substitute for an anti-poverty strategy.  
3  Other channels in the globalization-poverty relationship 
3.1 How  these  other channels work? 
We suggest that in addition to the growth conduit, there are other major channels through 
which globalization affects poverty. They include technology (the nature of technological 
progress and the technological diffusion process); factor mobility and more particularly the 
pattern of labour migration brought about by the process of globalization; vulnerability 
(increasing world integration and openness tends to be associated with greater volatility 
and vulnerability of poor households to economic and financial shocks); and the flow of 
information and institutions in both developed and developing countries that mediate the 
effects of these channels on the poor (Nissanke and Thorbecke 2006b). These channels 
may be largely responsible for explaining why the poor have not emerged as larger 
beneficiaries of contemporary globalization. According to the theoretical prediction 
embedded in the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, developing countries well endowed with 
unskilled labour should experience a decline in income inequality through an increased 
demand for unskilled labour, while unskilled labour in developed countries would lose out 
when equity is adversely affected. However, the empirical evidence reveals that wage gaps 
between skilled and unskilled workers have been increasing in many developing countries, 
particularly in Latin America and Africa.   
 
Several specific features associated with the current phase of globalization explain why the 
theoretical prediction does not hold. For example, the nature of technical progress and new 
technology is heavily biased in favour of skilled and educated labour, as technical change 
emanates from R&D activities in the developed (industrialized) countries in response to 
local conditions (Culpeper 2002). Hence, technical change tends to be labour saving and 
skill-biased, and new technology is complementary to capital and skilled labour, while it is 
a substitute for unskilled labour. Hence, technical change tends to increase inequalities in 
both developed and developing countries. Furthermore, technological diffusion and access 
to new technology is not universal and spontaneous while intensified privatization of 
research, for example in biotechnology, may have adverse effects on access of developing 
countries and the poor to new technology. The resulting widened productivity differences 
explain cross-country wage/income inequality. ‘Perverse’ factor movements could provide 
another explanation. Capital and skilled labour do not migrate to poor countries as much as 
among developed countries. Rather, there is a tendency for skilled labour to migrate from 
developing countries to developed countries, while unskilled labour migration tends to be 
strictly controlled. With capital market liberalization, there is a propensity for capital flight   9
to developed countries, particularly during periods of instability and crisis. Thus, Culpeper 
(2002) concludes that with such perverse movements, as globalization proceeds, developed 
countries would see inequality fall while developing countries would experience rising 
inequality.  
 
Furthermore, the differentiated degree of cross-border factor mobility (skilled labour and 
capital versus unskilled labour and land) affects the functional income distribution between 
labour and capital against the former. Wage equalization does not take place through 
labour migration, as was the case in the previous globalization era. Some workers are 
losing out as de facto labour mobility takes place through the increasingly free cross-
border capital mobility and the ability of transnational corporations (TNCs) to relocate 
production sites in response to changes in relative labour costs. In fear of driving away 
TNCs, governments of developing countries are less likely to enact regulations to protect 
and enhance labour rights (Basu 2003). Generally, the poor and unskilled are most 
adversely affected by asymmetries in market power and access to information, technology, 
marketing and TNC activities and the dominance of TNCs in commodity and value chain. 
 
Greater openness tends to be associated with greater volatility and economic shocks. Poor 
households tend to be more vulnerable to these shocks.13 The process of global disinflation 
while, on the one hand, helping the poor by containing price increases might have taken 
place at the possible cost of slower growth and fiscal retrenchment, thereby reducing the 
ability of nation states to provide adequate safety nets to those adversely affected by 
recurrent global financial and economic crises. Globalization has contributed to the 
enormous increase in the flow of information and knowledge worldwide. Internet 
technology and the spread of mass media transmit the most recent information almost 
instantaneously. At the same time, increased global flows of information can result in 
changing reference norms and increased frustration with relative income differences, and 
could increase volatility and insecurity for many cohorts. Finally, institutions act as a filter 
intensifying or hindering the positive and negative pass-through between globalization and 
poverty and can help explain the diversity, heterogeneity and non-linearity of outcomes.  
3.2 Technology  channel 
Focusing exclusively on the technology channel, Graff et al. (2006) argue that the potential 
exists for globalization to confer dramatically higher food productivity and rural incomes 
on developing countries via the mechanism of North-South technology transfer. As 
international diffusion of technology and sustainable innovation are determined by the 
institutional and financial capacity and the levels of human capital in developing countries, 
they argue that policies to facilitate North-South and South-South technology transfer and 
diffusion need to recognise global complexity of innovation sources and absorption 
capacities, and adapt accordingly. To realise the potential positive effects of biotechnology 
                                                 
13 See Birdsall (2002) for a discussion of many country cases where open capital markets adversely affected 
inequality and the poor.   10
on poverty reduction, they argue that the public and private sectors must establish 
institutions with local capacity for technology innovation and adaptation, reduce 
transaction costs in the process of international transfer of technology, and provide 
standardization, transparency, and access to information for property rights over 
technologies. In addition to significant investment in higher education and research 
capacity in low-income countries, they argue for a new type of institution potentially 
capable of overcoming the lack of access to intellectual property rights, namely the 
Intellectual Property Rights Clearinghouse (IPRC).  
 
The technology diffusion process by which new technologies are introduced in developing 
countries is analysed by Zhao (2006). He emphasises that technology adoption and 
diffusion are critical factors determining whether developing countries could truly benefit 
from new technologies through the globalization process. Even if a new technology can 
potentially increase the income level of rural farmers, its diffusion may be slow due to 
sunk costs of adoption and uncertainties about net payoffs of the technology in question. 
The lack of capital, credit and risk-sharing possibilities as well as the limited access to 
information about new technologies would hinder technology adoption and diffusion. An 
adoption of new technologies can be hindered by uncertainties about their efficiency. For 
example, without independent external information sources, farmers in developing 
countries have to rely heavily on their neighbours (so-called ‘leaders’, those who have 
already adopted the technologies) to obtain vital information about new methods.  
 
Aggarwal (2006) analyses the combined effects of openness,  technology transfer and 
institutions on environmental degradation. She examines various mechanisms through 
which globalization may affect the wellbeing of the poor through its effects on local 
ecosystems on which the poor depend for their livelihood. Focusing on the concept of 
resilience, that is the capacity of an ecosystem to maintain its structure and pattern of 
behaviour in the face of disturbance, she argues that the transfer of (essentially agricultural) 
technology often funded by external sources may lead to a shift towards more modern 
resource management practices that have very short-term time horizons. Firms and even 
farmers expect quick results and payoffs. These changes such as, for example, mono-
cropping, carried out over vast tracts of land reduce functional diversity and increase 
spatial uniformity in grassland ecosystems thus leading to a loss of resilience. As a 
consequence primary producers become more vulnerable to price volatility and shocks 
such as droughts. The loss of biodiversity results in a reduced number of pathways through 
which stress in the environment can be absorbed. An important observation of the study is 
that very often the governance structure of institutions (at village, state or national levels) 
does not overlap with the scale of ecosystems that often transcend political boundaries. 
Hence the closer matching of ecosystems and governance structures calls for the design of 
new and appropriate institutions—a key challenge for policymakers intent on reducing 
some of the negative effects of globalization on the environment and the rural poor. 
   11
3.3 Vulnerability  channel 
Even if one accepts the argument that globalization contributes to an increase in aggregate 
income measures, a second consequence of globalization is increased uncertainty resulting 
from greater variation in income and expenditure caused by global shocks. Ligon (2006) 
focuses his analysis on how globalization affects poverty through this vulnerability 
channel. Poor households, in particular, who tend to be risk-averse may be harmed by 
greater volatility in their income streams. He seeks to account for variations in the 
consumption distribution across countries and time, and then to estimate the welfare loss 
associated with different types of shocks, global shocks,  country-specific shocks and 
globalization shocks. Ligon finds that global shocks and globalization shocks are of minor 
importance relative to country-specific shocks in explaining variation in poorer quintile 
consumption growth. However, he finds that the total risk facing households within a 
country-quintile is large, with households willing to sacrifice on average 8.4 per cent of 
their expected consumption in exchange for eliminating all risk.  
 
The issue of increased vulnerability, resulting from trade liberalization, as experienced by 
countries in Central and East Europe (CEECs) since the early 1990s, is taken up by 
Montalbano et al. (2006). Focusing on macro vulnerability, their analysis shows that the 
extremely high volatility of consumption observed in this region is strongly related to trade 
shocks and that the per capita income of the poorest quintile of the population is most 
vulnerable to these trade shocks. On the basis of their empirical evidence, they argue for 
the need to adopt, in the case of emerging and transition countries, forward looking 
national policies to support their process of trade liberalization; that is, policies both to 
mitigate the impact of trade shocks and to enhance coping mechanisms. They also call for 
improvement in the governance of the globalization process by establishing a new ‘culture 
of prevention’ and designing mechanisms for limiting the size and frequency of shocks at 
the international level. 
3.4 Information  diffusion  channel 
The increased insecurity and vulnerability in the process of globalization is discussed by 
Graham (2006) with reference to ‘the economics of happiness’. She observes that there are 
noticeable differences between standard money metric measures of poverty and inequality 
in assessing the effects of globalization and people’s subjective assessment of some of the 
consequences of globalization. She explores how the economics of happiness can help 
explain these discrepancies between economists’ assessments of the benefits of 
globalization for the poor and individuals’ real and perceived welfare outcomes, such as 
vulnerability to falling into poverty among the near poor, distributional shifts at the local, 
cohort, and sector level; and changes in the provision and distribution of public services, 
among others. She suggests that the latter trends play a major role in determining public 
perceptions about the benefits and fairness of the globalization process. Focusing on 
income mobility and on reported wellbeing of the poor and near poor as a way to gauge 
movements in and out of poverty and distributive trends across time and across cohorts   12
within countries, she argues that while globalization is a major engine for growth in 
aggregate, globalization either introduces or exacerbates other trends that affect people’s 
wellbeing as much if not more than income, for example, through the increasing flow of 
information about the living standards of others, both within and beyond country borders. 
This flow of information can result in changing reference norms and increased frustration 
with relative income differences, even among respondents whose own income is rising. 
For example, individuals in a given developing country compare their incomes 
increasingly with those of relatively similar individuals in developed countries rather than 
within their own country. Graham’s analysis also illustrates how globalization can bring 
about increased volatility and insecurity for many cohorts, particularly those that are not 
well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities created by the opening of trade and 
capital flows. She argues that this insecurity, and the very real threat of falling into poverty 
for the near poor and lower middle classes, contributes to negative perceptions of the 
globalization process, particularly in countries where social insurance systems are weak or 
where existing systems are eroding.  
 
Graham concludes that many social and collective measures should be in place for 
globalization to have positive effects on poverty. These include measures such as public 
investments in health; institutions that can ensure adherence to basic norms of equity and 
fairness; and collective investments in social insurance to protect workers from the 
volatility that often accompany integration into global markets. In the absence of these 
measures, she warns that globalization will only create opportunities for those that are best 
positioned to take advantage of them, leaving behind large sectors of poor and vulnerable 
individuals. 
3.5  Institutions as a channel 
Institutions mediate the various channels and mechanisms through which the globalization 
process affects poverty. Sindzingre (2006) suggests that institutions act as a filter: 
intensifying or hindering the positive and negative pass-through between globalization and 
poverty and can help explain the diversity, heterogeneity and non-linearity of outcomes. 
For example, on the one hand, the impact of globalization on the poor is intermediated by 
domestic political economy structures and institutions such as social polarization, 
oligarchic structures, and predatory regimes, which may bias, confiscate or nullify the 
gains from globalization for particular groups of poor. On the other hand, the positive 
effects of globalization on growth and poverty can be found when institutional conditions 
are characterized by such features as political participation, social cohesion and 
management of social conflict arising directly from globalization effects.  
 
In particular, Sindzingre distinguishes two causal processes in the globalization-poverty 
relationships. The first one is the impact of globalization on institutions. Globalization can 
induce institutional change, which in turn may have positive or negative effects on poverty 
reduction. However, the pace of change can be very different among institutions. For 
example, globalization as a set of flows and policies is more likely to induce   13
transformation on the aspects of institutions that are already experiencing rapid change (for 
example, formal political or economic rules), and less likely on slow changing institutions 
such as social institutions. The second causal process is the impact of institutions on 
globalization. Globalization is ‘filtered’ (intensified or hindered) by institutions at the 
country and micro levels (villages and households).  
4 Paths  towards  pro-poor globalization 
It should be clear from the above discussion that the globalization-poverty relationship is 
complex and heterogeneous, involving multifaceted channels. Hence, it is understandable 
why the globalization debates tend to raise many emotive issues. As Bardhan (2006) notes, 
however, these debates often involve a clash of counterfactuals. For those against the 
ongoing process of globalization 
a counterfactual is the world of more social justice and less dominant 
trading and investment companies, which gives some more breathing space 
to the poor producers and workers. On the other side the counterfactual for 
pro-globalizers is the case when there is no (or limited) trade or foreign 
investment, a world which may be worse for the poor (as it is in the 
extreme cases of the closed economies of North Korea and Burma). The 
way out of this clash of counterfactuals is to insist that there are policies 
that may attempt to help the poor without necessarily undermining the 
forces of globalization.  
 
Hence, he holds the view that the distributional issue raised in the debate is not an 
argument against globalization (open trade and investment regimes) per se but for pro-
active public programmes to protect the poor. Indeed, not integrating into the global 
economy is not a viable or attractive development option for any nation. As noted in 
Deardorff and Stern (2006), countries that do not actively participate in trade liberalization 
are more likely to lose. They explore the impact of globalization on countries excluded 
from the process of globalization, that is those that have chosen (or in some cases were 
forced to choose) to remain relatively closed off from world markets. They use an analysis 
of the offer curve and a political economy model to examine the effect on countries that 
fail to participate in multilateral trade negotiations or preferential trading arrangements but 
nevertheless are engaged to some extent in international trade. 
 
They show that the ‘outsiders’ are likely to be harmed, through the terms of trade effects, 
by multilateral most favoured nation (MFN) tariff reductions as well as preferential trading 
arrangements (PTAs) between insiders. In their analysis, it is the exclusion of some sectors 
and/or some exporting countries from the benefits of tariff cuts that creates a bias against 
non-participating and excluded countries. The best cure for these excluded nations is to 
become active participants in world markets and the world economy, in general. While 
there is no guarantee that the welfare gains of joining the world economy would contribute 
to a reduction in the large-scale poverty that reigns in those countries and particularly in   14
Africa, their analysis suggest that it is likely to have a welfare increasing effect by 
stimulating economic growth for previously excluded countries. 
 
However, as noted in Nissanke and Thorbecke (2006b), a mere adoption of open trade and 
investment regimes per se does not guarantee developing countries’ entry into the ‘income 
convergence club’. Dowrick and DeLong (2001) suggest that (i) openness to the world 
economy does not necessarily promote convergence; (ii) many poor countries that have 
opened their economies since the 1980s have fallen behind, not just relatively but 
absolutely in terms of both income levels and structural development. The conundrum of 
the persistent ‘non-convergence’ of world income should be explicitly addressed in terms 
of structural features of the global economic relationships as they evolved over time and 
the institutional conditions found in participating countries. The income convergence trend 
among nation-states, to the extent that it has been observed historically, is likely to be 
explained more effectively by the nature of integration and specialization of subgroups of 
countries, rather than by the degree of openness of the trade and investment regimes per se, 
as is often claimed. In particular, in the current phase of globalization, developing 
countries have to reach a certain threshold by undergoing substantial changes in trade and 
production structure before they experience income convergence. 
 
Clearly, countries need to have reached the takeoff point before they can take advantage of 
the potential benefits of openness and globalization. One of the critical reasons why 
globalization may not be working for low-income developing countries lies in the fact that 
the effects of international trade on growth are critically dependent on the pattern of 
specialization and integration. By treating two sectors symmetrically, the conventional 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model (consisting of two countries, two sectors and two factors) 
shows that two countries equally reap aggregate gains from trade through efficiency 
gains.14 In reality, however, the pattern of specialization does matter for welfare 
implications of a trade-induced growth path on at least two accounts.  
 
Two sectors need not be symmetrical, first, through the well-known immiserizing effect of 
trade à la Bhagwati—that is to say the terms of trade (TOT) effects. Though many dismiss 
the likelihood of such an effect in a small economy, low-income countries dependent on 
the exports of a limited range of primary commodities face a deterioration of TOT, in 
particular if the ‘fallacy composition effect’ is seriously taken into account. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, many primary commodity exporting countries, which implemented structural 
adjustment programmes, underwent simultaneous export drives leading to depressed prices 
in many export commodities (Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001). In this context, Birdsall (2002) 
draws attention to the fact that measured by the trade-GDP ratio or tariff rates, most 
commodity-dependent countries have not been more reticent than less commodity-
dependent countries about participating in international trade, but the former group has 
                                                 
14 This two-sector model of international trade can be easily extended to N-sector model (for example, see 
Dornbusch et al. 1977).   15
failed to grow (especially after 1980) as they have remained dependent on exports of 
primary commodities. 
 
Furthermore, two sectors are not necessarily symmetrical because of the possible impact of 
dynamic scale economies, i.e. dynamic externalities through technological spillover 
benefits and the accumulation of knowledge capital. As the endogenous growth theory 
emphasises, it is this factor that largely accounts for diverging growth rates among 
countries. An application of this phenomenon to the trade model implies that a country 
specializing in an industry with a larger positive externality would experience a faster 
growth rate compared with the trading partner that specializes in an industry with a weaker 
externality. Thus, the growth rate of the two trading countries could differ considerably, 
depending on the pattern of specialization.  
 
If a country follows the Rybczinski line dictated by static comparative advantage with 
given relative resource endowments, the country with an initial comparative advantage in 
‘non-dynamic’ sectors may end up in a low equilibrium trap. Countries that have benefited 
from globalization and integration—such as those found in East Asia—are the ones which 
have successfully completed the structural transformation of the composition of their 
production and trade structure with continuous upgrading of their human skill endowments 
and technology/knowledge base. Consequently, their comparative advantages have 
evolved over time to maximize the benefit from dynamic externalities.  
 
Seen from this perspective, openness per se is not sufficient to ensure that development 
will follow. The internal pattern of growth and forms of integration are critical for 
countries to benefit from globalization-induced growth. Many low-income countries could 
be locked in an international poverty trap through integration (UNCTAD 2002). This 
points to the importance of reaching the takeoff stage before countries can benefit from 
globalization. 
 
Policies of strategic integration are called for, as the effects of international trade and 
investment on growth are critically dependent on the pattern of specialization and 
integration. Whether global market forces establish a virtuous circle or vicious circle 
depend on the initial conditions at the time of exposure and the effective design and 
implementation of policies to manage the integration process.  
 
Hence, in our view, a strategic position towards globalization cannot be equated with a 
mere passive adoption of free trade policy, or a simple fine-tuning of the pace and 
sequence of liberalization measures. At the same time, there is no place for an old-style, 
poorly designed and implemented protection policy, which is mired in unproductive rent 
seeking activities and patron-client relationships between governments and private agents. 
Import substitution strategy can work only when protection is granted to firms with a 
clearly specified ‘graduation’ clause. That is, protection should always be seen as 
temporary and ‘time bound’ by agents. Thus, as Kaplinsky (2000) notes, the issue   16
confronting policymakers is not whether to integrate into the global economy but how to 
integrate so as to have a stable foundation for sustainable and equitable growth. The 
strategic integration requires a long-term vision for upgrading a country’s comparative 
advantages towards high value added activities by climbing the technology ladder step by 
step through learning and adaptation. To succeed, developing country governments should 
consciously engage in building institutional capacities for integration, including a capable 
nation-state that is ready to take on the enormous challenges posed by globalization. The 
positive benefits from globalization are neither automatic nor guaranteed and passive 
liberalization would risk perpetual marginalization. 
 
In particular, national policies should be strategically designed in the light of the skewed 
nature of the ongoing process of globalization.  First, dynamic externalities and rent-rich 
activities are increasingly concentrated in high-skill, knowledge-intensive sectors. In short, 
the skill- and technology-related divide has become wider over recent decades. This trend 
is clearly reflected in the continuously declining terms of trade of less skill-intensive 
manufactured goods relative to high-skill and technology-intensive goods over the recent 
decades. The markets for many labour-intensive products, consisting increasingly of 
internationally standard goods, have come to resemble those for primary products. The 
entry of China and India into global markets for these products has depressed and will 
continue to depress real wages and returns in these sectors. 
 
Second, trade in the current phase of globalization is largely mediated through 
international production with an increasing share of intra-firm trade undertaken by TNCs, 
which command a lion’s share of global production and marketing networks. Trade is no 
longer conducted in arm’s length relationships, with final products being largely 
manufactured in a particular country and then exported. Instead, international production 
with vertical integration has increasingly dominated, in which production processes are 
sliced up and located globally (Kaplinsky 2000). There has been a tremendous growth in 
offshore outsourcing and global divisions of labour. Consequently, intra-firm trade within 
TNCs and inter-industry trade with highly differentiated products command a predominant 
share of global trade. At the same time, considerable asymmetries in market power and 
access to information, technology and other intangible knowledge assets between TNCs, 
on the one hand, and local farmers and traders in developing countries on the other hand, 
have resulted in a hugely skewed distribution of gains from trade. This is reflected in TNC 
dominance in commodity and value chains of international traded goods, as well as in 
frequently observed conditions such as the sharp decline in real wages in export processing 
zones. The benefits of productivity improvements, instead of going to the fragmented 
producers and farmers, are largely appropriated by TNCs and global supermarket chains 
that can exploit oligopolistic commodity markets.  
 
This uneven distribution of market power points to the need to improve the negotiating 
positions of developing country governments vis-à-vis TNCs, aiming at a strategic, 
targeted approach to FDI, so that FDI could facilitate skill- and technology-transfers and   17
generate strong positive productivity spillovers for domestic firms. In this context, Bardhan 
(2006) calls for a greater co-ordination of many regulations on an international scale as 
well as more energetic international attempts to certify codes against international 
restrictive business practices and to establish an international anti-trust investigation 
agency, possibly under WTO auspices. There is also a need for policy aiming at structural 
transformation in relation to various transmission mechanisms discussed in the study, in 
particular on the ground that there are critical thresholds for positive effects of 
globalization on poverty reduction to realise. The non-linear Laffer-type relationship 
between globalization and poverty, noted by both Milanovic (2002), and Agénor (2003), 
shows that openness helps those with basic and higher education but reduces the income 
share of those with no education and it is only when basic education becomes the norm, 
even for the poor, that openness exerts an income equalizing effect. Thus, at low-income 
levels, openness appears to affect equality negatively while at medium- and high-income 
levels it promotes equality. 
 
Sizable public investment in skill upgrading, as a specific pro-poor measure, is a key for 
ensuring positive benefits from globalization. At the same time those countries which have 
not yet reached the critical threshold, need (i) to invest in agriculture in order to reach the 
takeoff point to allow the structural transformation of their economies to proceed; (ii) to 
build both physical and social infrastructure in conjunction with development of healthy, 
educated and skilled human resources; and (iii) to strengthen institutions of social 
protection.  
 
Our review also raises the issue as to whether the present form of globalization/integration 
is conducive to a process of growth-cum-structural transformation, which is capable of 
engendering and sustaining pro-poor economic growth and favourable distributional 
consequences. Various studies suggest that globalization indeed produces adverse 
distributional consequences at both the national and global levels that could slow down or 
even reverse the present poverty alleviation trend. Hence, globalization should not be 
viewed as a reliable substitute for a domestic development strategy. Designing an active 
development strategy should be based on a better understanding on the key issue: what 
structure and pattern of growth contributes most to the alleviation of poverty. However, it 
is clear that to address the distributional consequences of globalization a set of much more 
effective redistributional instruments at both national and global levels is required. This 
would call for exploring alternative, more equitable forms and processes of globalization to 
start with. However identifying such new forms would requires a much better grasp of the 
concept of ‘pro-poor globalization’ than we presently hold.    
 
In analysing the various processes through which openness to foreign trade and long-term 
capital movements affects the lives of the rural poor, Bardhan (2006) argues for pro-active 
public programmes to help poor farmers adjust and co-ordinate, and suggests that 
international agencies that preach the benefits of free trade have an obligation to contribute 
to such programmes with financial, organizational and technical assistance. He also calls   18
for a greater co-ordination of many regulations on an international scale as well as more 
energetic international attempts to certify codes against international restrictive business 
practices and to establish an international anti-trust investigation agency, possibly under 
WTO auspices. 
 
For the WTO and other multilateral agencies to become a true development forum, it is 
important to recognise explicitly the hugely asymmetrical unequal economic power 
relationships as observed currently among member countries. These global agencies 
should endeavour at creating a genuine ‘policy space’ to allow developing countries to 
engage in their development agenda in the integration and globalization process. The 
current rules adopted by the WTO and other international agencies such as the principles 
of ‘single undertaking’ and ‘reciprocity’ should be critically reappraised in this light. It can 
be agued that a meaningful ‘level playing field’ could be created only if ‘differential’ 
treatments are legitimately instituted as a guiding rule governing multilateral negotiations.  
 
For advancing our understanding of what pro-poor globalization may entail, Basu (2006) 
focuses his analysis more on the process of marginalization resulting from globalization. 
He argues that the openness channel is likely to result in international prices of goods and 
services somewhere between prices in industrialized nations and prices in developing 
countries but closer to the former. Since (a) labour is less mobile across borders than goods 
and services; and (b) the nature of technological progress favours capital- and skill- 
intensive innovations, it seems reasonable to expect for sections of the labour force in poor 
nations, and especially the illiterate and unskilled who are unable to take advantage of the 
new technology, that wages will lag behind prices. Hence some of the poorest people may 
be subjected to a period of hardship before the benefits of opening up trickles down. 
 
Basu is concerned that the emphasis on maximizing per capita income in an era of fast 
globalization might not place sufficient weight on poverty and inequality reduction. Instead 
he proposes that the normative criterion which should be adopted in evaluating a country’s 
wellbeing is that of the per capita income of the bottom quintile of the population. Such a 
measure would combine reducing poverty and inequality. He proceeds to build a simple 
model showing that the adoption of the ‘bottom quintile income criterion’ in addition to 
leading to a pro-poor growth pattern would alleviate the erosion of each national 
government’s power to follow an equity-conscious policy—an outcome that obtains under 
the alternative case where income maximization is assumed to prevail. On the basis of his 
welfare analysis, Basu proceeds to suggest a radical distribution policy whereby workers in 
all firms as well as currently unemployed labourers be given a fraction of corporate equity 
earnings from all firms. He envisages that in a today’s globalizing world, such an ‘equity’ 
scheme should be extended to that of inter-country transfers. He suggests that developing 
rules for some inter-country transfer of equity income would insure that the functional 
income distribution between capital and labour (especially unskilled labour) would not 
become too uneven. In order to escape from what amounts to a Prisoner’s Dilemma   19
situation, Basu also argues for a creation of a new international co-ordination organization 
that helps co-ordinate inter-country anti-poverty policies.  
 
As Bardhan (2006) notes, globalization should not be allowed to be used, either by its 
critics or by its proponents, as an excuse for inaction on the domestic as well as the 
international front. On the basis of our review, we argue that what is at minimum called for 
is therefore liberalization to be accompanied by a comprehensive policy package for 
enhancing the capability of the poor and instituting a safety net for people who lose in the 
process. However, for making globalization more inclusive and truly pro-poor, we should 
go probably beyond this minimalist approach. We should start giving some serious 
consideration to more radical distributional measures such as proposed by Basu.  
Birdsall (2002) also advocates the need for a global social contract to finance equal 
opportunity investments in the initially weak and disadvantaged as well as for appropriate 
global arrangements to minimize the asymmetric risks and costs of global market failures. 
Indeed, we should get engaged earnestly in a fresh debate on developing new governance 
structures of the international trade and investment regimes so that the enormous benefits 
that globalization promises to generate through transfer of knowledge, technology and 
financial resources could be more equitably shared by the worlds’ poor.15 
References 
Addison, T., and G.A. Cornia (2001). ‘Income Distribution Policies for Faster Poverty 
Reduction’, WIDER Discussion Paper 2001/93, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki. 
Agénor, P.-R. (2002). ‘Does Globalization Hurt the Poor?’, mimeo, World Bank: 
Washington DC. 
Aghion, P., E. Caroli, and C. Garcia-Peñalosa (1999). Inequality and Economic Growth: 
the Perspective of the New Growth Theories, Journal of Economic Literature 37(4): 
1615-60. 
Aggarwal, R. (2006). ‘Globalization, Local Ecosystems and the Rural Poor’, World 
Development 34(8). 
Bardhan, P. (2006). ‘Globalization and Rural Poverty’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke 
(eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, 
Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Basu, K. (2003). ‘Globalization and Marginalization: Re-examination of Development 
Policy’, BREAD Working Papers 026, Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of 
Development: London and Cambridge. 
                                                 
15 See Nayyar (2002) for the debate on issues and institutional reforms required for improving the 
governance mechanisms over the globalization process.   20
Basu, K. (2006). ‘Globalization, Poverty and Inequality: What is the Relationship? What 
Can be Done?’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on 
the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Birdsall, N. (2002). ‘A Stormy Day on an Open Field: Asymmetry and Convergence in the 
Global Economy’, in D. Gruen, T. O’Brien, and J. Lawson (eds) Globalization, Living 
Standards and Inequality, Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Treasury: Sydney. 
Bourguignon, F. (2003). ‘The Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction: Explaining 
Heterogeneity across Countries and Time Periods’, in T.S. Eicher and S.J. Turnovsky 
(eds) Inequality and Growth: Theory and Policy Implications, MIT Press: Cambridge 
MA. 
Chen, S., and M. Ravallion (2004). ‘How Have the World’s Poorest Fared since the Early 
1980s?’, World Bank Policy Research Department Working Papers 3341, World Bank: 
Washington DC. 
Collier, P., and D. Dollar (2001). ‘Can the World Cut Poverty in Half? How Policy Reform 
and Effective Aid Can Meet International Development Goals’, World Development 29: 
1787-802. 
Cornia, G.A. (2004). ‘Inequality, Growth, and Poverty: An Overview of Changes of the 
Last Two Decades’, in G.A. Cornia (ed.) Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of 
Liberalization and Globalization, Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford 
and New York.  
Culpeper, R. (2002). ‘Approaches to Globalization and Inequality within the International 
System’, paper prepared for UNRISD Project on Improving Knowledge on Social 
Development in International Organization, September. 
Deardorff, A.V. and R.M. Stern (2006). ‘Globalization’s Bystanders: Does Trade 
Liberalization Hurt Countries that Do Not Participate?’, World Development 34(8). 
Deaton, A. (2001). ‘Counting the World’s Poor: Problems and Possible Solutions’, World 
Bank Research Observer 16(2): 125-47. 
Deaton, A. (2002). ‘Is World Poverty Falling’, Finance and Development 39(2): 4-7. 
Deininger, K., and L. Squire (1996). ‘A New Dataset Measuring Income Inequality’, 
World Bank Economic Review 10(3): 565-91. 
Dollar, D. (1992). ‘Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Grow More Rapidly: 
Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-85’, Economic Development and Cultural Change 
40(3): 523-44. 
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2001a). ‘Growth is Good for the Poor’, reprinted in A. Shorrocks 
and R. van der Hoeven (2004) Growth, Inequality, and Poverty, Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford.    21
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2001b). ‘Trade, Growth and Poverty’, World Bank Policy 
Research Department Working Papers 2615, World Bank: Washington DC. 
Dornbusch, R., S. Fisher, and P. Samuelson (1977). ‘Comparative Advantage, Trade and 
Payment in a Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Goods’, American Economic 
Review 67: 829-39 
Dowrick, S., and J.B. DeLong (2001). ‘Globalization and Convergence’, paper presented 
at the NBER Conference in Historical Perspective, 4-5 May, National Bureau of 
Economic Research: Cambridge MA. 
Graff, G., D. Roland-Holst, and D. Zilberman (2006). ‘Biotechnology and Poverty 
Reduction in Developing Countries’, World Development 34(8). 
Graham, C. (2006). ‘Globalization, Poverty, Inequality and Insecurity: Some Insights from 
the Economics of Happiness’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of 
Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke. 
Heshmati, A. (2006). ‘The Relationship between Income Inequality, Poverty, and 
Globalization’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on 
the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Jenkins, R. (2006). ‘Globalization, Production and Poverty’, in M. Nissanke and 
E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission 
Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Kaldor, N. (1956). ‘Alternative Theories of Distribution’, Review of Economic Studies 
23(2): 83-100. 
Kalwij, A., and A. Verschoor (2006). ‘A Decomposition of Poverty Trends across 
Regions: The Role of Variation in the Income and Inequality Elasticities of Poverty’, in 
M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: 
The Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Kaplinsky, R. (2000). ‘Globalization and Unequalization: What Can Be Learned from 
Value Chain Analysis?’, Journal of Development Studies 37(2): 117-46. 
Li, H., L. Squire, and H. Zou (1998). ‘Explaining International and Intertemporal 
Variations in Income Inequality’, Economic Journal 108(446): 26-43. 
Ligon, E. (2006). ‘Poverty and the Welfare Costs of Risk Associated with Globalization’, 
World Development 34(8). 
Milanovic, B. (2002). ‘Can We Discern the Effect of Globalization on Income 
Distribution? Evidence from Household Budget Surveys’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Papers 2876, World Bank: Washington DC.   22
Montalbano, P., U. Triulzi, C. Pietrobelli, and A. Federici (2006). ‘Trade Openness and 
Vulnerability in Central and Eastern Europe’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) 
The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave 
Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Naschold, F. (2004). ‘Growth, Distribution, and Poverty Reduction: LDCs are Falling 
Further Behind’, in A. Shorrocks and R. van der Hoeven (2004) Growth, Inequality, 
and Poverty, Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Nayyar, D. (2002). Governing Globalization: Issues and Institutions, Oxford University 
Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Nissanke, M., and B. Ferrarini (2001). ‘Debt Dynamics and Contingency Financing: 
Theoretical Reappraisal of the HIPC Initiative’, WIDER Discussion Paper 2001/139, 
UNU-WIDER: Helsinki.  
Nissanke, M., and H. Stein (2003). ‘Financial Globalization and Economic Development: 
Towards an Institutional Foundation’, Eastern Economic Journal 29(2): 287-308. 
Nissanke, M., and E. Thorbecke (2006a). ‘Overview’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke 
(eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, 
Palgrave Macmillan for UNU-WIDER: Basingstoke. 
Nissanke, M., and E. Thorbecke (2006b). ‘Channels and Policy Debate in the 
Globalization-Inequality-Poverty Nexus’, in M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The 
Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave 
Macmillan for UNU-WIDER: Basingstoke. 
Prasad, E., K. Rogoff, S. Wei, and M.A. Kose (2003). ‘Effects of Financial Globalization 
on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, IMF Occasional Papers 220, 
International Monetary Fund: Washington DC. 
Pritchett, L. (1996). ‘Measuring Outward Orientation in LDCs: Can It be Done?’, Journal 
of Development Economics 49: 307-35. 
Pritchett, L. (1997). ‘Divergence, Big Time’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3): 3-
17. 
Quah, D.T. (1996). ‘Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution 
Dynamics’, The Economic Journal 106: 1045-55. 
Ravallion, M. (1997). ‘Can High-Inequality Countries Escape Absolute Poverty?’, 
Economics Letters 56: 51-7. 
Ravallion, M. (2002). ‘Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages’, paper 
presented at World Bank Annual Bank Conference of Development Economics, 24-26 
June, Oslo. 
Ravallion, M. (2004a). ‘Competing Concepts of Inequality in the Globalization Debate’, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Papers 3243, World Bank: Washington DC.   23
Ravallion, M. (2004b). ‘Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer’, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Papers 3242, World Bank: Washington DC. 
Ravallion, M. (2006). ‘Looking beyond Averages in the Trade and Poverty Debate’, in 
M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: 
Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Rodriguez, F., and D. Rodrik (1999). ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic’s 
Guide to the Cross-National Evidence’, NBER Working Papers 7081, National Bureau 
of Economic Research: Cambridge MA. 
Sachs, J.D., and A. Warner (1995). ‘Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration’.  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, The Brookings Institution: 
Washington DC. 
Sindzingre, A. (2006). ‘Explaining Threshold Effects of Globalization on Poverty: An 
Institutional Perspective’, in M.  Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of 
Globalization on the World’s Poor: Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke. 
Shorrocks, A., and R. van der Hoeven (eds) (2004). Growth, Inequality, and Poverty, 
Oxford University Press for UNU-WIDER: Oxford. 
Thorbecke, E. (2004). ‘Economic Development, Income Distribution and Ethics’, mimeo, 
Cornell University: Ithaca. 
Thorbecke, E. and C. Charumilind (2002). ‘Economic Inequality and Its Socioeconomic 
Impact’, World Development 30(9): 1477-95. 
UNCTAD (2002). The Least Developed Countries Report 2002, UNCTAD: Geneva. 
Wade, R.H. (2002). ‘Globalization, Poverty and Income Distribution: Does Liberal 
Argument Hold?’, paper presented at the conference Globalization, Living Standards 
and Inequality, 27-28 May, Sydney. 
Williamson, J.G. (2002). ‘Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization’, 
WIDER Annual Lecture 6, UNU-WIDER: Helsinki. Reprinted in WIDER Perspectives 
on Global Development (2005) Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
World Bank (2002). Globalization. Growth and Poverty, A World Bank Research Report, 
Oxford University Press for the World Bank: New York. 
Zhao, J. (2006). ‘The Role of Information in Technology Adoption under Poverty’, in 
M. Nissanke and E. Thorbecke (eds) The Impact of Globalization on the World’s Poor: 
Transmission Mechanisms, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
 